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Orthogonal requirements for security policy enforcement and provision of user-friendly desktop en-
vironments have resulted in system architectures unable to satisfactorily meet both objectives. Physical
isolation of computers and networks according to sensitivity levels results in duplication and the inability
of authorized users who, according to policy, should have access to information to view it. In contrast,
it would appear that compatibility with current office productivity software drives out security because
popular commercial software packages execute only on untrusted platforms. The high cost of developing
multilevel secure platforms precludes their use on every desktop. Architectures are needed that maxi-
mize user’s ability to view and manage information at different sensitivity levels while still providing high
assurance of security policy enforcement.
We are developing a multilevel mail service that combines server-based high assurance mandatory
security policy enforcement with commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) operating systems and software on
client systems. The LAN system consists of three principal components. An evaluated high assurance
trusted computing base (TCB) is the locus of security policy enforcement and is the mail server platform.
COTS PC workstations provide the user’s desktop environment. These are not responsible for mandatory
security policy enforcement, but may enforce application-specific policies. Last, a Trusted Computing
Base Extension (TCBE), installed on the COTS PCs, ensures that a trusted path is established for user
identification and authentication as well as certain trusted operations. In addition, the TCBE is intended to
control the PC, ensuring object reuse requirements between sessions.
As our high assurance base, we are using the Wang, Inc. XTS-300. To achieve this architecture, we
have developed networking components at the TCB to support multiple trusted paths as well as multiple
sessions at different sensitivity levels. The result of this effort has been a Secure LAN Server. It provides
procedures for the creation of a trusted path between the TCBE and the TCB, over a TCP/IP network; and
a framework for utilization of the trusted path for user identification and authentication, and session level
negotiation. When combined with the TCBE, the Secure LAN Server creates a TCB interface through
which the protocol server, e.g. IMAP, and client applications communicate.
The University of Washington IMAP server has been ported to the high assurance base and has been
modified so that, at a particular level, the IMAP instantiation will not only be able to manage mail at that
level, but will also be able to view mail at all strictly dominated levels. Thus the clients are provided with a
truly multilevel view of mail. No modification of the COTS software providing the client GUI is required,
nor are IMAP server instances required to be trusted to enforce the mandatory security policy. Instead each
IMAP server instance manages the mail data structures appropriate to its session level. Mail at different
sensitivity levels is stored in different folders and these folders are visible at the client GUI, to be provided
by a popular COTS mail tool.
Our continuing research to support the Trusted Mail Service involves: development of identification
and authentication support in the context of the Secure LAN Server that will take advantage of existing
authentication databases of the evaluated TCB; understanding techniques to control the client PC for the
purposes of bootstrap, LAN communications control, and object reuse; design of the TCBE executive to
support trusted path operations and runtime control of the client PC; and investigation of emerging tech-
nologies that may be incorporated into the TCBE in support of trusted path negotiation, communications
security, and user identification and authentication.
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